We introduce a coding theoretic criterion for Yamamoto's strong security of the ramp secret sharing scheme. After that, by using it, we show the strong security of the strongly multiplicative ramp secret sharing proposed by Chen et al. in 2008. key words: ramp secret sharing, multiplicative secret sharing, strong security, algebraic geometry code
Introduction
Secret sharing [1] is a well-established topic in the information security [2] . It attracts renewed interest after Cramer et al. [3] revealed that any linear secret sharing with the so-called multiplicative (or strongly multiplicative) property can be used for the secure multiparty computation. Later, the multiplicative properties were generalized to the ramp secret sharing [4] , [5] . In [5, Section 4] , the authors also provided two explicit constructions of the strongly multiplicative ramp secret sharing based on algebraic curves, which can be regarded as algebraic geometric generalizations of the McEliece-Sarwate ramp secret sharing [6] based on the Reed-Solomon codes.
A set W of shares is said to be forbidden if W has no information about the secret vector s, and said to be qualified if s can be reconstructed from W [7] . W is said to be intermediate if it is neither qualified nor forbidden. The ramp secret sharing allows the existence of intermediate sets, while the perfect secret sharing prohibits the intermediate sets.
The merit of ramp secret sharing is that the sizes of shares can be smaller than that of the secret.
In ramp secret sharing [8] - [10] , an intermediate set may have critical partial information about the secret, as follows: Suppose that the secret is a 17-letter string "username:password", and an intermediate set W has partial information of 8 letters. The set W may be able to reconstruct "password", which is very undesirable. In order to prevent such a situation, Yamamoto [7] , [9] defined the notion of strong security for the ramp secret sharing, which requires any substring of the secret must not be reconstructed by an intermediate set (a formal definition is given later). An explicit construction with the strong security had remain unknown for many years, but recently Nishiara and Takizawa [11] proved that the the McEliece-Sarwate ramp secret sharing [6] mentioned earlier has the strong security. The purpose of this brief letter is to prove the strong security of [5, Section 4.3] , after introducing a generic criterion for the strong security constructed from a nested pair of linear codes.
Coding Theoretic Criterion for the Strong Security
Let F q be the finite field with q elements. We consider a linear ramp secret sharing constructed from a nested pair
share. An example of secret sharing by using C 2 ⊂ C 1 will be given in Example 4.
A coding theoretic criterion for such a linear ramp secret sharing was given in [12, Theorem 19 ], but we introduce a slightly more refined criterion. Firstly, we present a slightly generalized definition of the strong security [7] , [9] .
Definition 1: For a finite set J of positive integers, we define P J as the projection map from
For fixed I ⊂ {1, . . . , L} and J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, the secret sharing constructed from C 2 ⊂ C 1 and f : F L q → C 1 /C 2 is said to be strongly secure with respect to I and J if P J ( x) and P I ( s) are statistically independent, that is, the share set J has absolutely no information about the part P I ( s) of the secret, where s is the uniform random variable of secrets and x is the random variable of share vectors.
Proposition 2:
We retain notations from Definition 1. Let
The ramp secret sharing in Definition 1 is strongly secure with respect to I and J if and only if P J (C 1 ) = P J (C 3 ).
In order to prove Proposition 2, we review the next lemma from [13, Section 2]. , that is, the map restricting the domain of f to the subset P I (F L q ). The strong security condition with respect to I and J is equivalent to the condition that J is a forbidden set in the secret sharing constructed from C 3 ⊂ C 1 and f |P I (F L q ) . Then the claim of Proposition 2 immediately follows from Lemma 3.
Strong Security of the Strongly Multiplicative Ramp Secret Sharing
The ramp secret sharing proposed in [5, Section 4.3] is as follows. For terminologies in the algebraic geometry codes, please refer to [14] . Let F/F q be an algebraic function field of one variable, Q 1 , . . . , Q L , P 1 , . . . , P n pairwise distinct places of degree one in F, and G a divisor of F whose support does not contain Q 1 , . . . , Q L , P 1 , . . . , P n . Define
where g is the genus of F, then for every secret (s 1 , . . . , s L ) there exists a nonempty coset
A necessary and sufficient condition for
To ensure the existence of an F q -linear isomorphism f introduced in Section 2, hereafter we assume both (1) and (3) . Under the assumption (1) and (3), we define f to be
Example 4:
The most-known algebraic curve in coding theory is the Hermitian curve [14] . Its function field with q = 4 can be described as follows: Let F = F 4 (x, y) with the algebraic relation y 2 + y − x 3 = 0. This function field has genus g = 1. There is a unique place Q that is a common zero of two functions 1/x and 1/y. The degree of Q is one. All other places of degree one in F are zeros of the equation
. Let L = 2, Q 1 = (0, 0) and Q 2 = (0, 1). Let P 1 , . . . , P 6 be all places of degree one other than Q, Q 1 , Q 2 , that is,
, where α is a primitive element of F 4 . We choose G = 3Q and we have deg G = 3. The linear space L(G) becomes the F 4 -linear space spanned by 1, x and y. The evaluation of a function h ∈ L(G) at P i is done by substituting x by the first component of P i and y by the second of P i . Therefore a generator matrix of C 1 can be written as
On the other hand, h ∈ L(G) satisfies h(Q 1 ) = h(Q 2 ) = 0 if and only if h is a scalar multiple of x. Therefore, a generator matrix of C 2 can be written as
and we see that both (1) and (3) hold.
According to Eq. (2), for secret (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ F L 4 , a share vector (x 1 , . . . , x 6 ) is chosen randomly from the coset
The matrix in Eq. (5) is the same as the generator matrix in Eq. (4). 
Proof: We consider the dimension of P J (C 3 ) in Proposition 2. By reordering indices we may assume J = {1, . . . , |J|}.
The code P J (C 3 ) can be rewritten as P J (C 3 ) = {(h(P 1 ), . . . ,
where the equalities of the first and the second terms in (7) follow from the Riemann-Roch theorem [14, Theorem 1.5.17] and deg G − |I| ≥ deg G − |I| − |J| ≥ 2g − 1, the latter of which is implied by (6) . Equation (8) implies F |J| q = P J (C 3 ) ⊆ P J (C 1 ) ⊆ F |J| q . By Proposition 2 the secret sharing is strongly secure with respect to I and J.
Example 6: We retain notations from Example 4. Let I = {1} and J = {1}, which satisfy the assumption in Theorem 5. Then P J ( x) = (x 1 ), and x 1 = (1 − α)s 1 + r + αs 2 by Eq. (5). We can see that x 1 can become any value in F 4 by changing r, and that no information about s 1 or s 2 can be inferred from x 1 .
